Mean-median compromise method as an innovating voting rule in social choice theory

Single-Crossing, Strategic Voting and the Median Choice Rule

This paper studies the strategic foundations of the Representative Voter Theorem (Rothstein, 1991), also called the “second version” of the Median Voter Theorem. As a by-product, it also considers the existence of non-trivial strategy-proof social choice functions over the domain of single-crossing preference profiles. The main result presented here is that single-crossing preferences constitut...

Multiwinner Voting: A New Challenge for Social Choice Theory

Rational Choice Theory: An Overview

It seems easy to accept that rationality involves many features that cannot be summarized in terms of some straightforward formula, such as binary consistency.  However, this recognition does not immediately lead to alternative characterizations that might be regarded as satisfactory, even though the inadequacies of the traditional assumptions of rational behavior standard used in economic theo...

Rational Choice Theory: An Overview

It seems easy to accept that rationality involves many features that cannot be summarized in terms of some straightforward formula, such as binary consistency.  However, this recognition does not immediately lead to alternative characterizations that might be regarded as satisfactory, even though the inadequacies of the traditional assumptions of rational behavior standard used in economic theo...

On a compromise social choice correspondence

This paper analyzes the compromise social choice correspondence derived from the τ -value of digraph games. Among other things monotonicity of this correspondence is shown.