MCDA or preference-based social welfare functions?
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Social Welfare Function for Restricted Preference Domain
We consider the social preference ordering in a society where each individual’s preference domain is restricted to a subset of the whole set of alternatives. We show that the social welfare function satisfying unrestricted domain property, independence of irrelevant alternatives and weak Pareto optimality is always dictatorial when at least one individual is entitled to express his/her preferen...
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This paper presents two results about preference domain conditions that deepen our understanding of anonymous and monotonic Arrovian social welfare functions (ASWFs). We characterize the class of anonymous and monotonic ASWFs on domains without Condorcet triples. This extends and generalizes an earlier characterization (as Generalized Majority Rules) by Moulin (Axioms of Cooperative Decision Ma...
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We introduce a new consistency condition for neutral social welfare functions, called hyperstability. A social welfare function α selects a complete weak order from a profile PN of linear orders over any finite set of alternatives, given N individuals. Each linear order P in PN generates a linear order over orders of alternatives,called hyper-preference, by means of a preference extension. Henc...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Cost Effectiveness and Resource Allocation
سال: 2018
ISSN: 1478-7547
DOI: 10.1186/s12962-018-0122-y