Maxmin with multiple tastes and beliefs

Utilitarian Aggregation of Beliefs and Tastes

Harsanyi’s utilitarianism is extended here to Savage’s framework. We formulate a Pareto condition that implies that both society’s utility function and its probability measure are linear combinations of those of the individuals. An indiscriminate Pareto condition has been shown to contradict linear aggregation of beliefs and tastes. We argue that such a condition is not compelling: Society shou...

Aggregating Tastes, Beliefs, and Attitudes under Uncertainty∗

We provide results on the aggregation of beliefs and tastes for Monotone, Bernoullian and Archimedian preferences of Cerreia-Vioglio, Ghirardato, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Siniscalchi (2011). We propose a new axiom, Unambiguous Pareto Dominance, which requires that if the unambiguous part of individuals’ preferences agree, then society should follow it. We characterize the resulting social pre...

Some elements of Peronist beliefs and tastes

We study the beliefs and values of Peronism. Instead of a comprehensive approach, we focus on three elements. First, we study beliefs and values about the economic system present in Peron’s speeches during the period 1943–55. Second, given that these beliefs are non-standard (for economists), we present two models formalizing some of the key aspects (for example, the idea that there is somethin...

Eliciting Ambiguous Beliefs Under α-Maxmin Preference

We study the problem of elicitation of subjective beliefs of an agent when the beliefs are ambiguous (the set of beliefs is a non-singleton set) and the agent’s preference exhibits ambiguity aversion; in particular, as represented by α-maxmin preferences. We construct a direct revelation mechanism such that truthful reporting of beliefs is the agent’s unique best response. The mechanism uses kn...

Incomplete Preferences under Uncertainty: Indecisiveness in Beliefs versus Tastes