Maximin Envy-Free Division of Indivisible Items
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Two-Person Fair Division of Indivisible Items: An Efficient, Envy-Free Algorithm
T he problem of fairly dividing a divisible good, such as cake or land, between two people probably goes back to the dawn of civilization. The first mention we know of in Western literature of the well-known procedure, “I cut, you choose,” occurs in the Hebrew Bible, wherein Abraham and Lot divide the land that lies before them, with Abraham obtaining Canaan and Lot obtaining Jordan (Genesis 13...
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We propose a procedure for dividing indivisible items between two players in which each player ranks the items from best to worst. It ensures that each player receives a subset of items that it values more than the other player’s complementary subset, given that such an envy-free division is possible. We show that the possibility of one player’s undercutting the other’s proposal, and implementi...
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We study the problem of fairly dividing a set of goods amongst a group of agents, when those agents have preferences that are ordinal relations over alternative bundles of goods (rather than utility functions) and when our knowledge of those preferences is incomplete. The incompleteness of the preferences stems from the fact that each agent reports their preferences by means of an expression of...
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متن کاملEnvy-Free Division of Sellable Goods
We study the envy-free allocation of indivisible goods between two players. Our novel setting includes an option to sell each good for a fraction of the minimum value any player has for the good. To rigorously quantify the efficiency gain from selling, we reason about the price of envy-freeness of allocations of sellable goods — the ratio between the maximum social welfare and the social welfar...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Group Decision and Negotiation
سال: 2016
ISSN: 0926-2644,1572-9907
DOI: 10.1007/s10726-016-9502-x