Maximal domains of preferences preserving strategy-proofness for generalized median voter schemes
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences
We characterize the set of all individual and group strategy-proof rules on the domain of all single-dipped preferences on a line. For rules defined on this domain, and on several of its subdomains, we explore the implications of these strategy-proofness requirements on the maximum size of the rules’ range. We show that when all single-dipped preferences are admissible, the range must contain t...
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In this note we define generalized monotonicity which is a generalized version of monotonicity due to Muller and Satterthwaite (1979) for a social choice function under individual preferences which permit indifference, and shall show that generalized monotonicity and strategy−proofness are equivalent. I would like to thank Bhaskar Dutta and the anonymous referee for helpful comments. Citation: ...
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Despite the centrality of the median voter prediction in political economy models, overwhelming empirical evidence shows that legislators regularly take positions that diverge significantly from the preferences of the median voter in their districts. However, all these empirical studies to date lack the necessary data to directly measure the preferences of the median voter. We utilize a unique ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Social Choice and Welfare
سال: 1999
ISSN: 0176-1714,1432-217X
DOI: 10.1007/s003550050146