Mathematics of Consensus Building － Approach from Social Choice Theory

Social choice and the mathematics of manipulation

Budgeted Social Choice: From Consensus to Personalized Decision Making

We develop a general framework for social choice problems in which a limited number of alternatives can be recommended to an agent population. In our budgeted social choice model, this limit is determined by a budget, capturing problems that arise naturally in a variety of contexts, and spanning the continuum from pure consensus decision making (i.e., standard social choice) to fully personaliz...

Social Learning in Insects — From Miniature Brains to Consensus Building

Communication and learning from each other are part of the success of insect societies. Here, we review a spectrum of social information usage in insects--from inadvertently provided cues to signals shaped by selection specifically for information transfer. We pinpoint the sensory modalities involved and, in some cases, quantify the adaptive benefits. Well substantiated cases of social learning...

Social Choice Theory

1. revised and extended axiomatic theory and proof development. 2. a new curriculum with extensive questions, intuitive illustrations of key concepts, exercises in formal proofs, and an emphasis on the use of mathematical logic as a formal tool for the analysis of informal concept". 3. parallel languages-a completely new formal language containing concise formulas for use in proofs together wit...

Level \(r\) consensus and stable social choice

We propose the concept of level r consensus as a useful property of a preference profile which considerably enhances the stability of social choice. This concept involves a weakening of unanimity, the most extreme form of consensus. It is shown that if a preference profile exhibits level r consensus around a given preference relation, there exists a Condorcet winner. In addition, if the number ...