Mathematical Explanation beyond Explanatory Proof
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Lakatos and Hersh on Mathematical Proof
مفهوم اثبات در چند دهۀ اخیر مناقشهآمیز شده است. به طوری که افراد نظریه‌های مختلفی دربارۀ چیستی اثبات ارائه دادهاند. لاکاتوش و هرش از جملۀ این افراد هستند. نظریه‌های این دو فیلسوف شباهتها و اختلافات قابل توجهی دارند. به نظر می‌‌رسد که با مقایسه و بررسی نقادانۀ این دو نظریه فهم بهتری از مفهوم اثبات ریاضیاتی به دست خواهد آمد. دو وجه شباهت مهم بین این دو نظریه عبارتند از: دوگانه‌انگاری در اثبات ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
سال: 2020
ISSN: 0007-0882,1464-3537
DOI: 10.1093/bjps/axy009