Matching with Externalities
نویسندگان
چکیده
Abstract We incorporate externalities into the stable matching theory of two-sided markets. Extending classical substitutes condition to markets with externalities, we establish that matchings exist when agent choices satisfy substitutability. show substitutability is a necessary for existence in maximal-domain sense and provide characterization substitutable choice functions. In addition, extend standard insights theory, like side-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm, settings even though fixed-point techniques do not apply.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Review of Economic Studies
سال: 2022
ISSN: ['0034-6527', '1467-937X']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdac032