Matching structure and bargaining outcomes in buyer–seller networks
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
fault location in power distribution networks using matching algorithm
چکیده رساله/پایان نامه : تاکنون روشهای متعددی در ارتباط با مکان یابی خطا در شبکه انتقال ارائه شده است. استفاده مستقیم از این روشها در شبکه توزیع به دلایلی همچون وجود انشعابهای متعدد، غیر یکنواختی فیدرها (خطوط کابلی، خطوط هوایی، سطح مقطع متفاوت انشعاب ها و تنه اصلی فیدر)، نامتعادلی (عدم جابجا شدگی خطوط، بارهای تکفاز و سه فاز)، ثابت نبودن بار و اندازه گیری مقادیر ولتاژ و جریان فقط در ابتدای...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Social Choice and Welfare
سال: 2015
ISSN: 0176-1714,1432-217X
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-015-0935-y