Matching strategies of heterogeneous agents under incomplete information in a university clearinghouse

Optimal Negotiation Strategies for Agents with Incomplete Information

This paper analyzes the process of automated negotiation between two competitive agents that have firm deadlines and incomplete information about their opponent. Generally speaking, the outcome of a negotiation depends on many parameters—including the agents’ preferences, their reservation limits, their attitude toward time and the strategies they use. Although in most realistic situations it i...

Homo Moralis—preference Evolution under Incomplete Information and Assortative Matching

What preferences will prevail in a society of rational individuals when preference evolution is driven by the resulting payo s? We show that when individuals’ preferences are their private information, a convex combination of selfishness and morality stands out as evolutionarily stable. We call individuals with such preferences homo moralis. At one end of the spectrum is homo oeconomicus, who a...

Stable Matching with Incomplete Information∗,†

We formulate a notion of stable outcomes in matching problems with one-sided asymmetric information. The key conceptual problem is to formulate a notion of a blocking pair that takes account of the inferences that the uninformed agent might make. We show that the set of stable outcomes is nonempty in incomplete-information environments, and is a superset of the set of complete-information stabl...

Bargaining under Incomplete Information

A Semantics of Argumentation under Incomplete Information

We discuss a semantics of argumentation under incomplete information. In this paper, we mean by “incomplete information” that an agent does not know the other agent’s knowledge and therefore, the agent cannot predict which arguments are attacked and which counterarguments are used in order to attack the arguments. In this paper, we provide a more general framework for such argumentation system ...