Matching and Price Competition
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Matching and Price Competition: Comment
The theory of two-sided matching markets has interested researchers for its theoretical appeal and relevance to real-life applications. The matching of medical residents and hospitals in the United States has been studied extensively by Alvin E. Roth (1984) and others. The National Resident Matching Program (NRMP), the matching authority in the US hospital-resident matching market, runs a centr...
متن کاملMatching and Price Competition: Comment
We relax the assumption of symmetric linear costs in B&L’s (2006) “Matching and Price Competition” and compare the pricing equilibrium that results to the firmoptimal competitive equilibrium. With linear and asymmetric costs, competition may not be localized in the pricing equilibrium, but all other qualitative comparisons of B&L (2006) hold. With non-linear and symmetric costs workers’ average...
متن کاملMatching and price competition: beyond symmetric linear costs
Bulow and Levin’s (2006) “Matching and Price Competition” studies a matching model in which hospitals compete for interns by offering wages. We relax the assumption of symmetric linear costs and compare the pricing equilibrium that results to the firm-optimal competitive equilibrium. With linear and asymmetric costs, competition in the pricing equilibrium may not be localized, but all other qua...
متن کاملUnderstanding Price Controls and Nonprice Competition with Matching Theory
Price controls are one of the most common forms of market intervention by regulatory authorities. Price setting was a central duty of the Civil Aeronautics Board until the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978. The Dairy Price Support Program sets a minimum price for milk and other dairy products in the United States. Price caps for pharmaceutical drugs are a pervasive form of government interventio...
متن کاملMatching and price competition: would personalized prices help?
We analyze the generalized deferred-acceptance algorithm when preferences are known with an error. This algorithm incorporates personalized salaries and is considered as a replacement for the current algorithm for National Resident Matching Program (NRMP). Maintaining Bulow and Levin’s (2006) assumption on preferences, we show that an error in preferences of a worker propagates through the algo...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2003
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.441006