Maskin-monotonic scoring rules
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Maskin-monotonic scoring rules
We characterize which scoring rules are Maskin-monotonic for each social choice problem as a function of the number of agents and the number of alternatives. We show that a scoring rule is Maskin-monotonic if and only if it satisfies a certain unanimity condition. Since scoring rules are neutral, Maskin-monotonicity turns out to be equivalent to Nash-implementability within the class of scoring...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Social Choice and Welfare
سال: 2014
ISSN: 0176-1714,1432-217X
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-014-0835-6