Markov--Nash Equilibria in Mean-Field Games with Discounted Cost
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Constrained Markov Games: Nash Equilibria
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0363-0129,1095-7138
DOI: 10.1137/17m1112583