Markets versus negotiations: An experimental investigation
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Markets versus negotiations: An experimental investigation
* We are grateful for the suggestions made by Gary Bornstein, Itzhak Gilboa, Daniele Paserman, Marc Rysman, and seminar audiences at the Hebrew University, and at the ESA Meeting in Strasbourg. An associate editor and two anonymous referees provided useful comments. Financial support from the Aims Byudks foundation is gratefully acknowledged. † Corresponding author. Department of Management and...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2006
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2005.06.003