Market Share Contracts, Exclusive Dealing, and the Integer Problem
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Are Market-Share Contracts a Poor Man’s Exclusive Dealing?
Contracts that reference rivals have long been a focus of antitrust law and the subject of intense scholarly debate. This paper compares two such contracts, exclusive-dealing contracts and market-share contracts, in a model of naked exclusion. We discuss the different mechanisms through which each works and identify the fundamental tradeoff that arises: marketshare contracts are better at maxim...
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We examine how the feasibility of both nonlinear pricing and exclusive dealing arrangements affect incentives for market foreclosure when two manufacturers contract with a retail monopolist. Surprisingly, we find that although market foreclosure equilibria exist, they are Pareto-dominated (from each manufacturer’s perspective) by all nonforeclosure equilibria. If one believes that Paretodominat...
متن کاملMarket-Share Contracts with Asymmetric Information
In this paper, a dominant firm and competitive fringe supply substitute goods to a retailer who has private information about demand. We show that it is profitable for the dominant firm to condition payment on how much the retailer buys from the fringe (market-share contracts). The dominant firm thereby creates countervailing incentives for the retailer and, in some cases, is able to obtain the...
متن کاملExclusive Dealing and the Market Power of Buyers
This paper examines the e¤ects of exclusive dealing contracts o¤ered by an incumbent distributor. The e¤ectiveness of exclusive dealing contracts o¤ered by distributors is quite di¤erent from those o¤ered by incumbent manufacturers. The traditional literature has focused solely on exclusive dealing contracts made by incumbent manufacturers and has derived multiple equilibria within homogeneous ...
متن کاملPredatory Exclusive Dealing Predatory Exclusive Dealing *
While the previous literature on exclusive dealing has been concerned with the question of how exclusive dealing can raise static profits, this paper analyzes the question of how exclusive dealing can be used to predate in a dynamic context. It is shown that exclusive dealing may arise even if it reduces static profits. Exclusivity provisions may not only allow excluding efficient competitors, ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
سال: 2019
ISSN: 1945-7669,1945-7685
DOI: 10.1257/mic.20160350