Market-share contracts as facilitating practices
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Market-Share Contracts with Asymmetric Information
In this paper, a dominant firm and competitive fringe supply substitute goods to a retailer who has private information about demand. We show that it is profitable for the dominant firm to condition payment on how much the retailer buys from the fringe (market-share contracts). The dominant firm thereby creates countervailing incentives for the retailer and, in some cases, is able to obtain the...
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Contracts that reference rivals have long been a focus of antitrust law and the subject of intense scholarly debate. This paper compares two such contracts, exclusive-dealing contracts and market-share contracts, in a model of naked exclusion. We discuss the different mechanisms through which each works and identify the fundamental tradeoff that arises: marketshare contracts are better at maxim...
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Resale price maintenance (RPM), slotting fees, loyalty rebates and other related vertical practices can allow an incumbent manufacturer to transfer pro ts to retailers. If these retailers were to accommodate entry, upstream competition could lead to lower industry pro ts and the breakdown of these pro t transfers. Thus, in equilibrium, retailers can internalize the e ect of accommodating entry ...
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We study the effects of exclusionary contracts and market-share discounts (i.e., discounts conditioned on the share a firm receives of the customer’s total purchases) in an adverse selection model where firms supply differentiated products and compete in non-linear prices. We show that exclusionary contracts intensify the competition among the firms, increasing consumer surplus, improving effic...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The RAND Journal of Economics
سال: 2010
ISSN: 0741-6261
DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2010.00118.x