Market Reaction to Bank Liquidity Regulation

Liquidity provision and optimal bank regulation

We extend the set of regulatory instruments for banks’ liquidity provision by adding a policy instrument for controlling the fraction of perfectly-liquid accounts. We demonstrate how this instrument induces self-selection on behalf of depositors who are differentiated according to their probability of facing a liquidity shock. This selfselection leads to a market segmentation, which can break t...

The Market Reaction to Corporate Governance Regulation

This paper investigates the market reaction to recent legislative and regulatory actions pertaining to corporate governance. The managerial power view of governance suggests that executive pay, the existing process of proxy access, and various governance provisions (e.g., staggered boards and CEO-chairman duality) are associated with managerial rent extraction. This perspective predicts that br...

Funding Liquidity and Market Liquidity

Recent empirical studies have shown an increasing co-movement between fund and market liquidity, which is driven by common factors such as monetary shocks. Modeling this comovement becomes desirable to evaluate policies relating to liquidity and financial instability. This paper establishes a monetary model with capital to explain the dynamic interactions between funding and market liquidity in...

Market Liquidity and Funding Liquidity

We provide a model that links a security’s market liquidity — i.e., the ease of trading it — and traders’ funding liquidity — i.e., their availability of funds. Traders provide market liquidity and their ability to do so depends on their funding, that is, their capital and the margins charged by their financiers. In times of crisis, reductions in market liquidity and funding liquidity are mutua...

How to Enhance Market Liquidity