Market Design with Correlated Valuations

Approximately Optimal Mechanisms With Correlated Buyer Valuations

Approximately Optimal Mechanisms With Correlated Buyer Valuations

Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations

We study efficient, Bayes-Nash incentive compatible mechanisms in a social choice setting that allows for informational and allocative externalities. We show that such mechanisms exist only if a congruence condition relating private and social rates of information substitution is satisfied. If signals are multidimensional, the congruence condition is determined by an integrability constraint, a...

Informational Rents in Bargaining with Serially Correlated Valuations

Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency

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Interim Efficient Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations

We consider the class of Bayesian environments with one-dimensional private signals and interdependent valuations. For these environments, we fully characterize the set of interim efficient mechanisms which satisfy interim incentive compatibility and interim individual rationality constraints. In these mechanisms, the allocation rules assign probability one to an alternative that maximizes the ...