منابع مشابه
Calcification in marine molluscs: how costly is it?
Although crucial to our understanding of skeletal evolution in marine invertebrates, the cost of calcification has remained elusive for a simple reason: CaCO3 is an inorganic material. Its cost thus derives solely from the metabolic expenses of accumulating, transporting, and precipitating CaCO3 and cannot normally be separated from other metabolic costs. Traditionally, calcification cost has b...
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We study optimal dynamic financial contracts between a lender and a borrower in the presence of costly state verification. The efficient contract is such that (1) interim monitoring can prevent future inefficient liquidation of investment projects that are due to informational asymmetries and (2) two levels of bankruptcy can be distinguished, one that leads to monitoring and the other that lead...
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In this paper we show, in an incomplete contracts framework that combines asymmetric information and moral hazard, that by permitting insiders to trade on personal account the equilibrium level of output can be increased and shareholder welfare can be improved. There are two reasons for this. First, insider trading impounds information regarding the costs and benefits of effort and perk consump...
متن کاملMultiunit Ascending Auctions with Costly Monitoring∗
This paper analyzes multiunit discriminatory open-cry ascending auctions in which bidders have limited opportunities to place bids throughout the auction and rival bidder activity is not continuously monitored. We characterize the theoretical properties of a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in which bids are increasing in valuations, analyze identification and develop a flexible estimation approach...
متن کاملHigh frequency repeated games with costly monitoring
We study two-player discounted repeated games in which one player cannot monitor the other unless he pays a fixed amount. It is well known that in such a model the folk theorem holds when the monitoring cost is on the order of magnitude of the stage payoff. We analyze high frequency games in which the monitoring cost is small but still significantly higher than the stage payoff. We characterize...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Nature
سال: 2013
ISSN: 0028-0836,1476-4687
DOI: 10.1038/495174d