Marginal Utility and Cournot Stability Under Market Entry
نویسندگان
چکیده
Abstract This paper introduces into the discussion of stability quantity-oligopoly equilibrium, role that slope marginal utility curve and market entry in shaping equilibrium its stability. It does so by considering inverse multivariate linear demand functions notion related to mean value theorem. The cluster Cournot sellers is determined dictated this theorem rate decline product under consideration. Strategic complementarity found be case heterogeneity, while strategic substitutability associated with homogeneity, induces a modification limit
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Studies in Business and Economics
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['1995-0586', '1818-1228']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/sbe-2021-0015