Manuscript Acquisitions

The story of Osler's first four Arabic manuscript acquisitions.

Killer Acquisitions ∗

This article demonstrates that incumbent firms acquire innovative targets to discontinue the development of the targets’ innovation projects in order to preempt future competition. We call such acquisitions “killer acquisitions.” We illustrate the phenomenon using a model with product market competition, innovation, and endogenous acquisition decisions. In our model incumbent firms have incenti...

Homebiased Acquisitions

We show that CEOs exhibit a home bias in acquisitions. Firms are over twice as likely to acquire targets located in their CEOs’ home states than similar targets domiciled elsewhere. The bias is strongest for private targets and when acquirer governance is lax, and these private home deals do not create value, suggesting that CEOs acquire these targets for their own benefits. Unlike typical publ...

Manuscript no

Accepted Manuscript

This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. As a service to our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript. The manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof before it is published in its final form. Please note that during the production process errors may be discovered which could affect the co...