Manipulation and (Mis)trust in Prediction Markets
نویسندگان
چکیده
Markets are increasingly used as information aggregation mechanisms to predict future events. If policymakers and managers use markets guide policy managerial decisions, interested parties may attempt manipulate the market in order influence decisions. We study experimentally willingness of base decisions on under shadow manipulation. find that when there manipulators market, under-utilize revealed prices. Furthermore, mere suspicion manipulation erodes trust leading implementation suboptimal policies—even without actual This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, behavioral economics decision analysis.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Management Science
سال: 2022
ISSN: ['0025-1909', '1526-5501']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.4213