Managing Growth to Achieve Efficient Coordination in Large Groups
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Managing Growth to Achieve Efficient Coordination in Large Groups
Previous experiments using the minimum-effort coordination game reveal a striking regularity—large groups never coordinate efficiently. Given the frequency with which large real-world groups, such as firms, face similarly difficult coordination problems, this poses an important question: Why do we observe large, successfully coordinated groups in the real world when they are so difficult to cre...
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Several previous experiments using the minimum effort (weak link) coordination game reveal a striking regularity – large groups never coordinate tacitly on the efficient equilibrium. Given the frequency with which large real-world groups, such as firms, face similarly difficult coordination problems, this poses an important question for economics and organization: Why do we observe large succes...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Economic Review
سال: 2006
ISSN: 0002-8282
DOI: 10.1257/000282806776157588