Managing Fleet Capacity Effectively Under Second-Hand Market Redistribution
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Managing fleet capacity effectively under second-hand market redistribution.
Fishing capacity management policies have been traditionally implemented at national level with national targets for capacity reduction. More recently, capacity management policies have increasingly targeted specific fisheries. French fisheries spatially vary along the French coastline and are associated to specific regions. Capacity management policies, however, ignore the capital mobility ass...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: AMBIO
سال: 2013
ISSN: 0044-7447,1654-7209
DOI: 10.1007/s13280-012-0358-2