Managerial share ownership and discretionary accruals in Australia: Do independent and executive directors have different incentives?

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Corporate Ownership and Control

سال: 2011

ISSN: 1810-3057,1727-9232

DOI: 10.22495/cocv9i1art8