Managerial Reputation and Corporate Investment Decisions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Corporate financing decisions, managerial market timing, and real investment
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Financial Management
سال: 1993
ISSN: 0046-3892
DOI: 10.2307/3665866