Managerial Preferences, Corporate Governance, and Financial Structure
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Managerial Preferences , Corporate Governance , and Financial Structure ∗
Conflicts of interest between insiders (e.g, controlling shareholders) and outsiders (e.g., minority shareholders) are central to the analysis of modern corporation. In an integrated continuous-time contingent claims framework with imperfect corporate governance, we examine a controlling shareholder’s optimal choice of capital structure, ownership concentration, private benefit diversion, consu...
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This article explores linkages between the firm’s financial structure, corporate governance, and the management of labor. It reviews various literatures, in particular drawing from Financial Economics, Industrial Relations, and Human Resource Management, to investigate a set of potential linkages. Two ideal types in terms of marketand relational-based financing and outsiderand insider-based gov...
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The nonlinear relationship between corporate value (Tobin's Q) and managerial ownership is well documented. This has commonly been attributed to the onset of managerial entrenchment, which results in a decrease of corporate value for increasing levels of managerial holdings. We propose a more complex structure for the corporate value { managerial ownership function, which accounts for the e®ect...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2006
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.891414