Managerial Performance Incentives and Firm Risk during Economic Expansions and Recessions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Board of director collusion, managerial incentives and firm values
This paper investigates the effects of board of director collusion on managerial incentives and firm values. Recent academic research hints at the social network of board of directors as an important conduit for coordinating corporate governance policies, such as managerial pay, and curbing competition. We study a model where managers can exert unobservable cost-cutting effort and investigate t...
متن کاملStock Option Incentives and Firm Performance
This paper analyzes the performance consequences of employee stock options for a broad sample of firms during the period 1996-1999. Our tests are performed separately for the top-5 executives and all other employees. We estimate the expected level of option incentives based on each firm’s economic characteristics. We examine the association between the unexpected level of option incentives and ...
متن کاملManagerial Incentives and Competition
This paper experimentally tests the impact of managerial incentives on competitive (market) outcomes. We use a Cournot duopoly game to show that when managers’ incentives are based on the firm’s absolute performance (profits), collusion can be sustained. However, when managers’ incentives are based on the firm’s relative performance (their profits relative to the other firm’s profits), this dri...
متن کاملMarket liberalization and firm performance during China’s economic transition
Received: 5 June 2004 Revised: 2 May 2005 Accepted: 30 May 2005 Online publication date: 24 November 2005 Abstract This paper examines the impact of market liberalization on firm performance through institutional changes during the economic reform in China. The conceptualization focuses on the decentralization of control, ownership restructuring, and industrial policy as the primary institution...
متن کاملFirm Performance, Entrenchment and Managerial Succession in Family Firms
This paper investigates whether the family status of a company’s top officer affects managerial replacement decisions in UK firms. We report evidence that family firms are characterized by higher levels of board control and weak internal governance in the form of independent company board structures. Consistent with a managerial entrenchment hypothesis, we find evidence that family CEOs are les...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2014
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2476964