Managerial narratives: a critical dialogical approach to managerial identity
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Qualitative Research in Organizations and Management: An International Journal
سال: 2010
ISSN: 1746-5648
DOI: 10.1108/17465641011042008