Managerial myopia and the unintended real consequences of conditional conservatism

نویسندگان

چکیده

We examine whether the demand for conditional conservatism produces unintended real consequences that are exacerbated by managerial incentives to report higher earnings. document a robust positive association between and earnings management (REM), particularly firms whose CEOs face greater compensation capital market Using mediation analyses, we find has negative indirect relation with future returns via REM over next 1–3 years. In additional tests, is attenuated debt-to-equity, which suggests debtholders moderate conservative reporting REM. Our findings suggest that, in contrast its monitoring benefit, can exacerbate myopia, resulting firm value.

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Business Finance & Accounting

سال: 2022

ISSN: ['1468-5957', '0306-686X']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/jbfa.12675