Managerial form, ownership and efficiency: a case‐study of Argentine agriculture
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Agricultural Economics
سال: 1994
ISSN: 0169-5150,1574-0862
DOI: 10.1111/j.1574-0862.1994.tb00338.x