Managerial Entrenchment and Firm Value: A Dynamic Perspective
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
سال: 2015
ISSN: 0022-1090,1756-6916
DOI: 10.1017/s0022109015000423