Managerial Entrenchment and Corporate Social Performance
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Business Finance & Accounting
سال: 2008
ISSN: 0306-686X,1468-5957
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-5957.2008.02090.x