Managerial Economics of Vertically Coordinated Agricultural Firms

Environmental Regulation in Vertically Coordinated Industries

This research was supported by the U.S Department of Agriculture National Research Initiative Competitive Grants Program under Cooperative Agreement No. 99354007797. We are grateful to Bob Chambers, Ethan Ligon, Tigran Melkonyan, David Zilberman, and seminar participants at Columbia University, the University of California-Berkeley, and the University of Texas-Dallas for their comments and sugg...

Park Environmental Regulation in Vertically Coordinated Industries

Many notable pollution problems occur in industries where production is carried out under vertical coordination arrangements that are characterized by conditions of double moral hazard. In contrast to situations characterized by full informatio n, we show that standard prescriptions of environmental economics do not apply. Imposing a Pigouvian tax equal to the marginal cost of pollution does no...

Managerial Firms , Vertical Integration , and Consumer Welfare ∗

We show that vertical integration decisions of managers may affect adversely consumers even in the absence of monopoly power in either supply or product markets. This effect is most likely to come about when demand is initially high and there is a negative supply shock or when demand is low and there is a positive demand shock. The results are robust to the introduction of active shareholders a...

Openness, Managerial Incentives and Heterogeneous Firms

This paper examines the effects of trade openness on the optimal incentives firms provide to their managers (and hence firm-level productivity) in the new heterogeneous-firm trade framework. Export market selection and firm heterogeneity are shown to be the key determinants of firm owners’ optimal choices of the incentive contracts, which affect the cost-reduction efforts of their managers. I s...

Purdue Agricultural Economics Report