Managerial Economics and Global Competition
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Managerial Incentives and Competition
This paper experimentally tests the impact of managerial incentives on competitive (market) outcomes. We use a Cournot duopoly game to show that when managers’ incentives are based on the firm’s absolute performance (profits), collusion can be sustained. However, when managers’ incentives are based on the firm’s relative performance (their profits relative to the other firm’s profits), this dri...
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Recent research has found drastic differences across gender in how performance and preferences are affected by competition. In light of these, this study addresses how gender affects the use of competitive compensation. When given information about worker ability, male managers, but not female managers, are reluctant to choose the tournament for a female worker. The data also show that even tho...
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discussions of the future of competition law on the transnational level often reflect assumptions about the role of economics. perhaps the most pivotal of these assumptions is that economics can provide a basis for global competition law convergence. it is pivotal, because choices and strategies relating to competition law often depend on it. moreover, many see convergence among competition law...
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This article analyzes the effect of product-market competition on managerial incentives. In contrast to Hart (1983a), I show that competition may actually exacerbate the incentive problem. The difference in results derives from our different assumptions about managerial preferences. The importance of assumptions about preferences suggests that we do not yet understand the precise mechanism thro...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Symphonya. Emerging Issues in Management
سال: 2005
ISSN: 1593-0319
DOI: 10.4468/2005.1.02brondoni