Managerial Discretion in Accruals and Informational Efficiency

E-CRM and Managerial Discretion

Most sectors of industry, commerce, and government have reported variation in the performance payoff from electronic customer relationship management (e-CRM). In this paper we build on surprisingly sparse literature regarding the importance of managerial discretion to show that the heterogeneity of beliefs held by managers about e-CRM execution matter when explaining e-CRM success. Drawing on a...

Discretion in Managerial Bonus Pools

* We are grateful to Ulf Schiller for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. We also thank Yanruo Wang for excellent research assistance. Agency theory has for most part focused on the nature and efficiency properties of " complete " incentive contracts. Accordingly, a contract is viewed as a collection of " if-then " statements such that a specific payoff results if a particular...

Irreversible investment, managerial discretion and optimal capital structure

We explore the significance of employee compensation and alternative (reservation) income on investment timing, endogenous default, yield spreads and capital structure. In a real-options setting, a manager’s incentive to under(over)invest in a project is associated to labor income he has to forego in order to work on the project, the manager’s salary, his stake on the project’s equity capital a...

Market efficiency, managerial compensation, and real efficiency

Article history: Received 10 October 2012 Received in revised form 14 October 2013 Accepted 23 March 2014 Available online 12 April 2014 We examine how an exogenous improvement in market efficiency, which allows the stock market to obtain more precise information about the firm's intrinsic value, affects the shareholder–manager contracting problem, managerial incentives, and shareholder value. ...

Merger Efficiency and Managerial Incentives