Managerial Compensation and the Market Reaction to Bank Loans
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Bank Mergers , the Market for Bank CEOs , and Managerial Incentives *
Compensation of bank CEOs increases after mergers, suggesting that executives may engage in acquisitions to enjoy size-related personal benefits (Bliss and Rosen, 2001). Alternatively, bank mergers can be viewed as the efficient assignation of merged assets to the managerial team best suited to realize merger gains. Theories of executive compensation based on managerial productivity and optimal...
متن کاملMarket efficiency, managerial compensation, and real efficiency
Article history: Received 10 October 2012 Received in revised form 14 October 2013 Accepted 23 March 2014 Available online 12 April 2014 We examine how an exogenous improvement in market efficiency, which allows the stock market to obtain more precise information about the firm's intrinsic value, affects the shareholder–manager contracting problem, managerial incentives, and shareholder value. ...
متن کاملManagerial Hedging and Incentive Compensation in Stock Market Economies
Managerial Hedging and Incentive Compensation in Stock Market Economies Incentive compensation exposes managers to the risk of their firms. Managers can hedge their aggregate risk exposure by trading in financial markets, but cannot hedge their firmspecific exposure. This gives them an incentive to pass up firm-specific projects in favor of standard projects that contain greater aggregate risk....
متن کاملTransparency in the Interbank Market and the Volume of Bank Intermediated Loans
In this paper we study the impact of more transparency in the interbank market on the volume of bank intermediated loans and on the profitability of the banking business. Transparency is modeled by means of the informational content of publicly observable signals correlated to the random interbank interest rate. We find that more transparency may increase or decrease the volume of bank loans. I...
متن کاملManagerial Power and Compensation
According to the widely used Managerial Power Model, a higher hierarchical position with associated higher power leads to higher compensation. In contrast, the Compensating Wage Differentials Model argues that there is a non-positive relationship between positional power and total compensation. Both power and income yield utility and in equilibrium managers are prepared to trade-off the two ele...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Review of Financial Studies
سال: 2003
ISSN: 1465-7368
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/16.1.237