Managerial Attention and Worker Performance
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Managerial Attention and Worker Performance
We present a novel theory of the employment relationship. A manager can invest in attention technology to recognize good worker performance. The technology may break and is costly to replace. We show that as time passes without recognition, the worker’s belief about the manager’s technology worsens and his effort declines. The manager responds by investing, but this investment is insufficient t...
متن کاملManagerial Attention and Worker Engagement
We study a dynamic agency problem with two-sided moral hazard: the worker chooses whether to exert effort or shirk; the manager chooses whether to invest in an attention technology to recognize worker performance. In equilibrium the worker uses past recognition to infer managerial attention. An engagement trap arises: absent recent recognition, both worker effort and managerial investment decre...
متن کاملManagerial Style and Attention∗
Is firm behavior mainly driven by its environment or rather by the characteristics of its managers? We develop a cognitive theory of manager fixed effects, where the allocation of managerial attention determines firm behavior. We show that in complex environments, the endogenous allocation of attention exacerbates manager fixed effects. Small differences in managerial expertise then may result ...
متن کاملEndogenous Precision of Performance Measures and Limited Managerial Attention
In this paper, we model two drivers which underlie the economic tradeoff shareholders face in designing incentives for optimal effort allocation by managers. The first driver is limited managerial attention, by which we mean that performing one task may have an adverse effect on the cost-efficiency of performing another. The second is the presence of a performance reporting task, by which we me...
متن کاملLimited Managerial Attention and Endogenous Precision of Performance Measures
In this paper, we model two drivers which underlie the economic trade-off shareholders face in designing incentives for optimal effort allocation by managers. The rst driver is limited managerial attention, by which we mean that performing one task may have an adverse effect on the cost-ef ciency of performing another. The second is the presence of a performance reporting task, by which we mean...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Economic Review
سال: 2016
ISSN: 0002-8282
DOI: 10.1257/aer.20140772