Majority Voting On Tax Shares: a Simple Life-Cycle Model
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Tax Competition and the Choice of Tax Structure in a Majority Voting Model
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Public Finance Quarterly
سال: 1981
ISSN: 0048-5853
DOI: 10.1177/109114218100900104