منابع مشابه
Majority voting on restricted domains
In judgment aggregation, unlike preference aggregation, not much is known about domain restrictions that guarantee consistent majority outcomes. We introduce several conditions on individual judgments su¢ cient for consistent majority judgments. Some are based on global orders of propositions or individuals, others on local orders, still others not on orders at all. Some generalize classic soci...
متن کاملMajority voting on restricted domains: a summary
In judgment aggregation, unlike preference aggregation, not much is known about domain restrictions that guarantee consistent majority outcomes. We introduce several conditions on individual judgments su¢ cient for consistent majority judgments. Some are based on global orders of propositions or individuals, others on local orders, still others not on orders at all. Some generalize classic soci...
متن کاملVoting on Majority Rules∗
We analyze an overlapping generations model of voting on “reform projects”. These resemble investments in that they first require some investment expenditure and later pay off. Since the time during which old people get the benefit is shorter, or because older people are more wealthy and hence pay more taxes, they are more conservative (against reforms) than young people. We show that if people...
متن کاملStrategy-Proof Voting Rules over Restricted Domains
We have seen in Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 that in some voting games, strategic behavior sometimes leads to extremely undesirable outcomes. Therefore, we may want to prevent voters’ strategic behavior. However, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem tells us that for any voting rule that satisfies some natural properties, there must exist at least one voter who has an incentive to misreport her prefer...
متن کاملIterated Majority Voting
We study a model in which a group of agents make a sequence of collective decisions on whether to remain in the current state of the system or switch to an alternative state, as proposed by one of them. Examples for instantiations of this model include the step-wise refinement of a bill of law by means of amendments to be voted on, as well as resource allocation problems, where agents successiv...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2010
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2010.01.003