Majority Voting and the Welfare Implications of Tax Avoidance
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Majority Voting and the Welfare Implications of Tax Avoidance
A benchmark result in the political economy of taxation is that majority voting over a linear income tax schedule will result in an inefficiently high tax rate whenever the median voter has a below average income. The present paper examines the role of tax avoidance for this welfare assessment. We find that the inefficiency in the voting equilibrium is the lower, the higher the average level of...
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This paper analyzes the determinants of the welfare state. In a model that integrates majority voting and lobbying by interest groups, we show how the bargaining power of the unskilled and the skilled workers’ lobby affects the size of the welfare state: The more influential the union representing the unskilled, the greater the extent of redistribution. On the other hand, the presence of depend...
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Majority voting and social evaluation functions are the main alternatives proposed in the literature for aggregatingindividual preferences. Despite these being very different, this papershows that the ranking of income distributions, symmetric under the same transformation, by S-Gini consistent social evaluation functions and majority voting coincide if and only if the inequality index under co...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2009
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1470635