Majority Voting: A Quantitative Investigation
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Voting on Majority Rules∗
We analyze an overlapping generations model of voting on “reform projects”. These resemble investments in that they first require some investment expenditure and later pay off. Since the time during which old people get the benefit is shorter, or because older people are more wealthy and hence pay more taxes, they are more conservative (against reforms) than young people. We show that if people...
متن کاملIterated Majority Voting
We study a model in which a group of agents make a sequence of collective decisions on whether to remain in the current state of the system or switch to an alternative state, as proposed by one of them. Examples for instantiations of this model include the step-wise refinement of a bill of law by means of amendments to be voted on, as well as resource allocation problems, where agents successiv...
متن کاملMajority voting on restricted domains
In judgment aggregation, unlike preference aggregation, not much is known about domain restrictions that guarantee consistent majority outcomes. We introduce several conditions on individual judgments su¢ cient for consistent majority judgments. Some are based on global orders of propositions or individuals, others on local orders, still others not on orders at all. Some generalize classic soci...
متن کاملImplementation of Majority Voting Rules∗
I study implementation by agenda, a straightforward voting mechanism that is widely used in practice. The main result resolves an open question which dates back to Black [1958] and Farquharson [1957/1969]. It establishes that any neutral majority voting rule which satisfies the two necessary conditions identified in prior work (McKelvey and Niemi [1978]; Moulin [1986]) as well as a significantl...
متن کاملMajority voting leads to unanimity
We consider a situation where society decides, through majority voting in a secret ballot, between the alternatives of ‘reform’ and ‘status quo’. Reform is assumed to create a minority of winners, while being efficient in the Kaldor–Hicks sense.We explore the consequences of allowing binding transfers between voters conditional on the chosen alternative. In particular, we establish conditions u...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2014
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2547618