Majority Runoff Elections: Strategic Voting and Duverger's Hypothesis
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Majority runoff elections: Strategic voting and Duverger's hypothesis
The majority runoff system is widely used around the world, yet our understanding of its properties and of voters’ behavior is limited. In this paper, we fully characterize the set of strictly perfect voting equilibria in large three-candidate majority runoff elections. Considering all possible distributions of preference orderings and intensities, we prove that only two types of equilibria can...
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In Appendix C, for a large class of Poisson games, we define Bayes–Nash equilibrium and extend the definition of strictly perfect equilibrium (Okada 1981). We show some useful properties of Nash equilibria and we characterize the set of strictly perfect equilibria. We define a limit property of Nash equilibria as the number of players grows large: asymptotic strict perfection. Our characterizat...
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I attempt to quantify strategic voting using the mixed (proportional and plurality) dual ballot election system in Hungary. The main finding is that there is a moderate amount of desertion of “third parties”. The smaller the likelihood of a second round, and the closer the large parties are, the more pronounced the desertion, consistent with a hypothesis of strategic voting. I thank Chishio Fur...
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Elections have two distinct roles in society. First, they serve as a mechanism to decide policies when individuals disagree about appropriate actions. Second, they aggregate information dispersed in the population. This second role can be found even in situations where all individuals agree on the appropriate policies. The focus of this essay is on information aggregation in elections and on th...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2013
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2326258