منابع مشابه
Majority Rules and Coalition Stability
We consider a class of symmetric games with externalities across coalitions and show that, under certain regularity conditions, restricting the deviating power to majority guarantees the existence of core-stable allocations. We also show that if majorities can extract resources from minorities, stability requires a supermajority rule, whose threshold is increasing in the extraction power.
متن کاملStability scores: measuring coalitional stability
We introduce a measure for the level of stability against coalitional deviations, called stability scores, which generalizes widely used notions of stability in non-cooperative games. We use the proposed measure to compare various Nash equilibria in congestion games, and to quantify the effect of game parameters on coalitional stability. For our main results, we apply stability scores to analyz...
متن کاملMajority Rules and Incentives*
A club's majority rule defines the number of members that must approve a policy proposed to replace the status quo. Since the majority rule thus dictates the extent to which winners must compensate losers, it also determines the incentives to invest in order to become a winner of anticipated projects. If the required majority is large, members invest too little because of a holdup problem; if i...
متن کاملOn the self-(in)stability of weighted majority rules
A voting rule f is self-stable (Barberà and Jackson [4]) if any alternative rule g does not have sufficient support in the society to replace f , where the decision between f and g is based on the rule f itself. While Barberà and Jackson focused on anonymous rules in which all agents have the same voting power, we consider here the larger class of weighted majority rules. Our main result is a c...
متن کاملCoalitional stochastic stability
This paper takes the idea of coalitional behaviour groups of people occasionally acting together to their mutual benefit and incorporates it into the framework of evolutionary game theory that underpins the social learning literature. This paper defines an equilibrium selection criterion which we call coalitional stochastic stability (CSS). This differs from existing work on stochastic stabilit...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2012
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2137664