Majority Rule

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چکیده

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Majority Consensus and the Local Majority Rule

we only show one further result that emphasizes our point that understanding LMP is fundamental to understanding any generalization of this process. A simple generalization of the local majority process would allow vertex v to have some resistivity towards color switch. Formally, for a nonnegative integer kv, we de ne a kv-local majority rule for vertex v: ct+1 v = ( ctv if jfw 2 Nv : ctw = ctv...

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(Biased) Majority Rule Cellular Automata

Consider a graph G = (V,E) and a random initial vertex-coloring, where each vertex is blue independently with probability pb, and red with probability pr = 1− pb. In each step, all vertices change their current color synchronously to the most frequent color in their neighborhood and in case of a tie, a vertex conserves its current color; this model is called majority model. If in case of a tie ...

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Philosophy Compass

سال: 2014

ISSN: 1747-9991

DOI: 10.1111/phc3.12164