منابع مشابه
Multilateral Bargaining for Resource Division
We address the problem of how a group of agents can decide to share a resource, represented as a unit-sized pie. We investigate a finite horizon non-cooperative bargaining game, in which the players take it in turns to make proposals on how the resource should be allocated, and the other players vote on whether or not to accept the allocation. Voting is modelled as a Bayesian weighted voting ga...
متن کاملMajority Rule in a Stochastic Model of Bargaining
In this paper we consider multilateral stochastic bargaining models with general agreement rules. For n-player games where in each period a player is randomly selected to allocate a stochastic level of surplus and q n players have to agree on a proposal to induce its acceptance, we characterize the set of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs and establish their existence. We show that...
متن کاملDemand bargaining and proportional payoffs in majority games
We study a majoritarian bargaining model in which players make payoff demands in decreasing order of voting weight. The unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is such that the minimal winning coalition of the players that move first forms with payoffs proportional to the voting weights. This result advances previous analysis in terms of one or more of the following: a) the simplicity of the...
متن کاملBargaining and Majority Rules: A Collective Search Perspective∗
We study a collective search process in which tentative proposals arrive sequentially and members of a committee decide whether to accept the current proposal or continue searching. The acceptance decision is made according to a (qualified) majority rule. We study which members have more impact on the decision, as well as the degree of randomness of the decision, as members get patient. When pr...
متن کاملEnvy can promote more equal division in alternating-offer bargaining
Bargainers in an open-ended alternating-offer bargaining situation may perceive envy, a utility loss caused by receiving the smaller share that is modeled in some social preferences in addition to self-interest. I extend Rubinstein (1982)’s original solution of the bargaining problem for two self-interested bargainers to this strategic situation. Bargainers still reach agreement in the first pe...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
سال: 2015
ISSN: 1387-2532,1573-7454
DOI: 10.1007/s10458-015-9290-8