Magmatic emanations

Security Limits for Compromising Emanations

Nearly half a century ago, military organizations introduced “Tempest” emission-security test standards to control information leakage from unintentional electromagnetic emanations of digital electronics. The nature of these emissions has changed with evolving technology; electromechanic devices have vanished and signal frequencies increased several orders of magnitude. Recently published eaves...

Information Leakage from Opti al Emanations

FASE: Finding Amplitude-modulated Side-channel Emanations

While all computation can potentially generate electromagnetic (EM) side-channel signals, some of the strongest and farthest-propagating signals are created when an existing strong periodic signal (e.g. a clock signal) becomes stronger or weaker (amplitude-modulated) depending on processor or memory activity. However, modern systems create emanations at thousands of different frequencies, so it...

Compromising emanations: eavesdropping risks of computer displays

Electronic equipment can emit unintentional signals from which eavesdroppers may reconstruct processed data at some distance. This has been a concern for military hardware for over half a century. The civilian computer-security community became aware of the risk through the work of van Eck in 1985. Military " Tempest " shielding test standards remain secret and no civilian equivalents are avail...

Studies of Magmatic Systems