Low price equilibrium in multi-unit auctions: the GSM spectrum auction in Germany
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Low Price Equilibrium in Multi–Unit Auctions: The GSM Spectrum Auction in Germany
The second–generation (GSM) spectrum auction in Germany is probably the most clear cut example of a low price outcome in a simultaneous ascending–bid multi– unit auction. The present paper gives an account of the events, describes the auction rules and market conditions, and provides a game theoretic explanation of low price equilibrium in simultaneous, ascending–bid multi–unit auctions. In par...
متن کاملLow Price Equilibrium in Multi–Unit Auctions: The GSM Spectrum Auction in Germany1
The second–generation (GSM) spectrum auction in Germany is probably the most clear cut example of a low price outcome in a simultaneous ascending–bid multi–unit auction. The present paper gives an account of the events, describes the auction rules and market conditions, and provides a game theoretic explanation of low price equilibrium in simultaneous, ascending–bid multi–unit auctions. In part...
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In two-sided multi-unit auctions having a variety of payment rules, including uniform-price and discriminatory auctions, a monotone pure strategy equilibrium (MPSE) exists when bidders are risk-neutral with independent multi-dimensional types and interdependent values. In fact, all mixed strategy equilibria are ex post allocationand interim expected payment-equivalent to MPSE. Thus, for standar...
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As the fiscal agent of the Canadian Federal government, the Bank of Canada uses a sequence of multi-unit, sealed-bid, discriminatory-price auctions to manage excess cash reserves and to sterilize the effects of fiscal operations, thus ensuring that its monetary-policy goals are met. These auctions, which form an important part of the short-term loan market in Canada, provide a unique laboratory...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Industrial Organization
سال: 2003
ISSN: 0167-7187
DOI: 10.1016/s0167-7187(03)00058-4