Lotteries, Sunspots, and Incentive Constraints
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Lotteries, Sunspots, and Incentive Constraints
We study a prototypical class of exchange economies with private information and indivisibilities. We establish an equivalence between lottery equilibria and sunspot equilibria and show that the welfare and existence theorems hold. To establish these results, we introduce the concept of the stand-in consumer economy, which is a standard convex, finite consumer, finite good, pure exchange econom...
متن کاملIntroduction to Sunspots and Lotteries
This introduces the symposium on sunspots and lotteries. Two stochastic generalequilibrium concepts, sunspot equilibrium (SE) and lottery equilibrium (LE), are compared. It is shown that, for some general, pure-exchange economies which allow for consumption nonconvexities or moral hazards, the set of LE allocations is equivalent to the set of SE allocations provided that the randomizing device ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2002
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2792