Loss Modification Incentives for Insurers Under Expected Utility and Loss Aversion
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: De Economist
سال: 2015
ISSN: 0013-063X,1572-9982
DOI: 10.1007/s10645-015-9259-7